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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiffs/Appellees Grahns submit that the questions
for review are:
1.
Have the petitioners raised an important or special
reason which would warrant review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals where the standards of Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure have not been met?
2.
Is the holding, by the Court of Appeals and the
Trial Court that the co-petitioners, Bradshaws, were not bona fide
purchasers of certain adjacent property, in conflict with prior
decisions by Utah appellate courts?
3.
Do the petitioners, by presenting their contrary
position in regard to what the evidence showed, point up a
departure by the Court of Appeals from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings and, if so, does that departure call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision?
4.
Is the petition of the Defendants/Appellants in the
above-referenced matter frivolous as defined in Rule 3 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and, accordingly, should sanctions
such as attorneys1 fees be granted in favor of Plaintiffs?
CITATION TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed
on October 24, 1990, and was published at 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 47.
A copy is attached hereto in Appendix 1. A Petition for Rehearing
was filed by Defendants, and denied by the Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Respondents accept the statements regarding the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which are set forth in the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, but for the self-serving
conclusions therein.
NO CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
There are no controlling provisions of constitutions,
statutes, ordinances or regulations that are involved in the case.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action which involves reformation of a legal
description concerning a boundary to a certain unique parcel of
real estate in Salt Lake County.

(The parcel is an estate, and not

part of a commercial subdivision plat.)

The action also involved

the rescission of a subsequent sale of an adjacent parcel of real
estate, which sale had been made between the Co-Petitioners.
The remedy of reformation was sought and awarded

to

conform the deed to the intention of the parties and repair a
mistake

which

had

description.

The

been

made

by

the

Trial

Court

and,

drafter

of

thereafter,

the

the

legal

Court

of

Appeals, by unanimous decision, ruled in favor of the Respondents
(the "Grahns").
The

Petitioners

and

the

Respondents

have

disagreed

throughout this matter in regard to what facts were established by
the evidence.
found

In essence, the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals

that the evidence

supported

the Grahns1

position.

The

Statement of the Facts in the Joint Petition for Writ of Certiorari
(the "Petition") which sets forth the Petitioners1 viewpoint is
frustratingly inaccurate. A full review of the Record supports the
facts as recited by the Court of Appeals (146 Utah Adv. Rep. 47,
at 47-48, see Appendix 1, hereto) and the Trial Court's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Appendix 2, hereto).
Through an exhaustive effort in the Respondents1 Brief
to the Court of Appeals, the Grahns thoroughly demonstrated the
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inaccuracies advanced by Petitioners (then, the Appellants), and
the facts which were revealed by the preponderant evidence, all
with detailed citations to the Record,

(Respondents1 Brief, pages

4 through 24, as supplemented by Addendum 1, thereof, pages 1
through

13.)

To

repeat

that

task

in

this

Brief

would

be

inappropriate, as those factual issues are beyond the scope of
review now before the Supreme Court.

It is significant that the

courts below have unanimously found that the Petitioners failed to
establish their case.
However, it is necessary to recite certain facts

which

are relevant to the argument by Petitioners that Co-Petitioners
Bradshaws were bona fide purchasers.
1.
Bradshaws were aware, as they considered a
purchase of the parcel adjacent to the Grahn parcel, that the
south and east border of the Grahns' private drive served as
the boundary between the two parcels.
(Transcript:
N.
Taylor, page 14, lines 6 through 11; page 42, lines 23 through
25; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 390, lines 4 to 9.)
2•
Bradshaws had been advised and were aware that
the Grahns had purchased the improved portion of the property
including the home thereon, and that the Grahns had been told,
and therefore believed, that they were the owners of the
private drive. Bradshaws were further aware of the aesthetic
and geologic easement in favor of the Grahns along the south
and east side of the private drive.
(Transcript:
Mr.
Bradshaw, page 214, lines 4 through 23; Mrs. Gregory, page
184, lines 24 to 25, page 185, lines 1 through 12; Mrs.
Bradshaw, page 367, lines 17 to 19; page 374, lines 14 to 17,
page 385, line 9; and pages 388 to 389.)
3.
Then, on October 11, 1986, some forty (40) days
prior to their closing, Bradshaws learned of facts that
indicated that a mistake had been made in drafting the legal
description.
Within a few days, they and Gregory came to
understand the ramifications thereof and they were given
numerous opportunities prior to closing, by Co-Petitioner
Gregory, to avoid their earnest money agreement to purchase
Page 3 of 14

the adjacent parcel. At all times prior to closing, Bradshaws
were well aware that the Grahns had not been advised of the
discovery of a mistake. (Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages 312
to 313; Mr. Bradshaw, page 399, lines 14 to 22; page 407,
lines 2 through 8.)
4.
Bradshaws understood the risks involved, for
them, in their proposed purchase of the adjacent parcel.
(Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 399, lines 14 to 22; Mrs.
Gregory, page 196, lines 16 to 22.)
5.
Bradshaws chose to accept those risks and to
purchase the adjacent parcel; but only with the benefit of a
side agreement which would allow them to avoid the purchase
if they could not have the land which encroached across the
private drive of the Grahns. Pursuant to the side agreement,
that land was only quit-claimed to Bradshaws. (Exhibit 13-P;
Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, pages 178-179, lines 12 to 25, 1
to 11; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 384, lines 4 to 13, page 387, lines
15 to 25.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED

FOR LACK OF AN IMPORTANT OR SPECIAL REASON FOR REVIEW.
Rule 49(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
("URAP11) provides that, in a petition for Writ of Certiorari, the
petitioner shall submit:
[w]ith respect to each question presented, a direct and
concise argument explaining the special and important reasons
as provided in Rule 46 for the issuance of the Writ.
Rule 46, URAP, refers to the types of issues which present special
and important reasons appropriate for Supreme Court consideration.
The

Justices

standards.

of

the

Court

are

certainly

Appropriate reasons include:

familiar

with

the

inconsistencies between

decisions of different panels of the Court of Appeals on the same
issue of law; inconsistencies between the decision of the Court of

Page 4 of 14

Appeals and a decision of the Supreme Court, on state or federal
law; or departures from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings•
The Petitioners fail to set forth and establish any such
important or special reason.

No question of municipal, state or

federal law has been presented in this matter.

The Petitioners

fail to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals decision in this
matter was inconsistent with any other Utah ruling.

Instead, the

Petitioners categorically claim departures have been made from the
accepted

and

usual

course

of

judicial

proceedings,

and

then,

without describing the claimed departure, essentially reargue the
case as it was argued both at the trial level and again at the
level of the Court of Appeals.
The Petitioners attempt to reargue their position, citing
the Grahns, the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals as their
opposition.

Without citations to the Record,

statements "of fact" to support their theory.

they

set

forth

(As noted above, the

factual arguments are not well grounded in the Record.)
Mindful that the issue before this Court is whether to
grant

certiorari, the

Grahns will

refrain

from

Petitioners into a reargument of the case below.
to

note

that

both

the Trial

Court

and

the

following

the

It should suffice
Court

of

Appeals

concluded differently than the Petitioners would like them to have
concluded, and that the decisions were consistent with both the
evidence and the applicable law.
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In conclusion, the arguments

of the Petitioners

are

merely rearguments of those points which were raised at trial level
and then at the Court of Appeals1

level, without success.

No

special or important reason is advanced by Petitioners for review
by the Supreme Court.

Instead, the Petitioners boldly march on to

make their arguments as if Certiorari had already been granted.
A Writ of Certiorari is not warranted in this case.
II.

THE

TRIAL

COURT«S

AFFIRMED

HOLDING

THAT

THE

BRADSHAWS WERE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH
CASE LAW.
In their third argument, the Petitioners readdress and
reargue their claim that the Bradshaws were bona fide purchasers,
and that, as a result, reformation could not be made.

Petitioners

indicated

of

that

the

Trial

Court

and

the

Court

Appeals

contradicted previous law in Utah on the subject. Yet, Petitioners
cite no previous law which is inconsistent with that decision.
Their argument is on the facts.
The decision of the Court of Appeals on this point was
consistent with law.

As indicated in the opinion of the Court of

Appeals, it was clear from the evidence that Bradshaws could not
have been bona fide purchasers.
Petitioners, at trial and on appeal, based their bona
fide purchaser claim on the argument that the sale took place at
the time that the Bradshaw/Gregory earnest money agreement was
entered into, and not the closing thereon.
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Bradshaws learned of the mistake in the property description, and of its effect, forty (40) days
prior to closing on the property. They knew that the Grahns were unaware of the mistake. They understood the
effect of the mistake, but chose to press forward to see if they could take advantage of the situation. They
refused opportunities to rescind the deal, which were granted to them by Co-Petitioner Gregory. They went ahead
to close, taking the title to the property in question by Quit Claim Deed only; but, even then, not before a
side agreement was entered into which would allow them to avoid the purchase if they could not have the land
which encroached across the private drive. As Bradshaws well knew, the Grahns reasonably believed that the
private drive was on Grahn land. Bradshaws also knew that Gregory intended and believed, prior to learning of
the mistake, that he had already conveyed that private drive to the Grahns. (Citations to the Record in regard
to each of these facts are indicated in the Statement of the Case, above.)

4

The ruling of the Court of Appeals was consistent with
Utah

case

law,

Petitioners.

and

not

contradictory

thereto

as

by

That Court and Petitioners both cite the Utah case

of Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984).
their

claimed

argument's

introductory

sentence,

In fact, in

Petitioners

quote

as

follows:
The right of reformation of a deed can be cut off by purchase
of the property by a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice of the mistake. (Id., at 1273, emphasis supplied)
Clearly, that statement by the Court resolves the question raised
by Petitioners. The conveyance to be reformed, that to the Grahns,
was prior in time to that conveyance to the Bradshaws.

Before the

Bradshaw closing, Bradshaw had notice of the mistake.
There is no reason, special, important or otherwise, for
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to review this issue.

The

Petitioners1 argument is frivolous.
III. THERE HAS BEEN NO DEPARTURE FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND THERE IS NO REASON FOR
THE EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVISION.
The

Petitioners

allege

in

their

first

and

second

arguments that the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, in a
nutshell, failed to get the point.

By cross reference between the

Statement of Questions Presented for Review in the Petition (page 1
thereof) and their first two arguments, it is apparent that the
Petitioners allege for purposes of certiorari that the Court of
Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course, by altering
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Appeals

found that:

1.
Petitioners had failed to marshall the evidence
necessary
to demonstrate that the Findings oi Fact,
Conclusions of Law and decision of the lower court were
"clearly erroneous11 (Grahn v. Gregory, Supra, pages 49, 50);
and
2.
In one respect, concerning an ambiguous finding
that the parties "accepted" a figure of 1.11 acres as the size
of the Grahn parcel, the Grahns had carried their burden and
established that the questionable finding was clearly
erroneous, and therefore that portion of the decision which
relied upon that findi ng w a s r e v e r s e d (Id. , p a n e s so r"x
<-=.

<';
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-owever, t o d e m o n s t r a t e

usual

]4

•

course

0f

j udicial

proceedings.

In fact, the Petitioners seem to draw the conclusion

that there must have been a departure, because the courts did not
see the evidence as they would have liked.
Because facts are argued in the Brief by Petitioners, as
if certiorari had been granted, it is tempting to demonstrate in
response the weakness of those arguments.

However, again, the

Grahns recognize that arguments concerning the Record are beyond
the scope of the issue now before the Court.

They will therefore

refrain.
One argument is heavily relied upon by the Petitioners,
maybe as a claimed demonstration of a departure from the usual
course.

The argument is that:

* * * the legal description in the agreement and in the
deed were exactly what the parties intended and were in
essential terms identical. Thus there was no mistake made by
a drafter of the deed. (Petition, page 11.)
This point is then compared with the cases of Chesapeake Homes,
Inc. v McGraff 240 A.2d 245 (MD App. 1968) and Eiland v. Powell,
136 W.Va. 25, 65 SE2d 737, 742 (1951).
The assertion is not consistent with the Findings of Fact
(Appendix 2 ) , which were affirmed.
to

represents Utah

case

law.

contradictory to Utah rulings.

Neither of the cases referred

Neither

is demonstrated

to be

Neither is contradictory to the

ruling in Grahn v. Gregory.
2
Those cases involved platted commercial subdivisions. In each case, a party entered into an agreement
to purchase a lot by reference to a lot number. In each case, a mistake had allegedly been made by a sales
agent in making representations in regard to the boundaries of the platted lot. The representations were not
documented. The true facts were easily determinable by inquiry. Each court found that the parties had not had
a meeting of the minds and that reformation would not be appropriate. The Grahn matter is easily distinguished.
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It is therefore evident that there is no conflict even
with the case law of other jurisdictions which

is raised

for

consideration by this Court.

There has been no departure from

accepted and usual procedure.

There is no special and important

reason to justify the granting of the Petition

for a Writ of

Certiorari.
IV.

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS FRIVOLOUS,

AS DEFINED IN RULE 33(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
According to Rule 33(b), URAP, a petition to the Supreme
Court which

lf

* * * is not grounded in fact, not warranted by

existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law" is frivolous.

For reasons set

forth in the foregoing arguments, the Grahns respectfully submit
that the Petition is frivolous.

It does not meet the said Rule

33(b) standards or those implied by Rule 46, URAP.
The good faith submission of the Petition is clearly in
doubt.
1.
As indicated above, and as might be established
by painstaking resort to the Grahns1 Brief to the Court of
Appeals, and the Record cited therein, the Petitioners have
advanced "facts" for consideration by this Court which are not
established in the Record. They make no meaningful effort to
cite the Court to the Record, as an investigation of their
general citations to the transcript would make evident.

In this matter a single estate lot was privately divided into two parcels, along the edge of a private drive
which was to separate the two. The subdivider (Gregory) directed and intended that the drive would be the
boundary. He believed it was, and so advised the Grahns personally, and through his agents. Unfortunately,
the scrivener of the metes and bounds description did not accurately describe that boundary location, even
though he intended to, and thought he had done so. The earnest money agreement between Grahns and Gregory even
documented that intent. The Trial Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the parties had agreed
as to what land was being purchased and ordered reformation of the deed accordingly.
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2.
Petitioners
claim
that existing
law
is
inconsistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals, but
fail to cite the law to which they refer. Petitioners fail,
further to submit any argument to extend, modify or reverse
existing law.
3.
Petitioners claim that there were departures
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
but fail to explain their claim.
4.
Petitioners make an issue of a claim that the
adjacent lot was unbuildable.
The issue is moot.
(See
Suggestion of Mootness, filed on even date herewith.) It is
suggested that an inquiry would reveal that Petitioners knew
their arguments were practically unsupportable at the time
submitted to the Supreme Court.
5.
Finally, but certainly not least, Petitioners
barge past the threshold of certiorari and make their
arguments without first obtaining permission to do so.
It

is also noted that the appendix

to the

Petition

exceeds the authority granted under Rule 49(a)(10) of the URAP.
Grahns object to the appendix in the Petition.

The appendix, with

its copy of a prior Statement of Facts and of a page from the
transcript of the trial, is prejudicial

if reviewed without a

review of the remaining portions of the Record and the Grahns1
Brief.

Those

portions

of

the

Petition's

appendix

should

be

disregarded.
Rule 49(e), URAP, provides that:
The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity,
and clarity whatever is essential to a ready and adequate
understanding of the points requiring consideration will be
a sufficient reason for denying the petition.
Grahns respectfully submit that Petitioners have failed
three respects.

in all

For that reason, also, it is appropriate to deny

the Petition.
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Grahns submit that the Petition was therefore, frivolous.
Under Rules 3 3 and 40, URAP,

sanctions are appropriate.

The

Grahns should not have been required to incur attorneys1 fees to
respond to the Petition. The Grahns therefore respectfully request
that they be awarded, at the least, their attorneys' fees incurred
in connection with their opposition to the Petition.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari fails to meet the
requisite

standards,

important reason

and

should

be

denied.

No

special

and

is raised for consideration by the Supreme Court;

and none exists.
The

Petition

fails

to

establish

that

there

is

an

inconsistency between the decision of the Court of Appeals and
other Utah case law.

The Petition fails to demonstrate a departure

from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.

It

merely reargues that which did not convince the courts below.
The Petition is frivolous, as defined by the rules, and
sanctions are therefore appropriate.
Respectfully submitted this

J&1

1991.
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Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq.
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Attorneys for
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Attorneys for
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defendant's credibility under Rule 609(a).
9. Defendant additionally complains that during
crossexaminauon, the prosecutor questioned him
concerning his unemployment. An appellate court
has discretion as to the nature and extent of the
opinions it renders and we need not 'address in
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim
raised and properly before us on appeal." Stare v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989); see Stare v.
Jones, 783 P.2d 560, 565 (Uuh Ct. App. 1989).
Defendant did not object to this questioning and we
decline to specifically address this claim because it is
not a substantial issue.
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OPINION

BILLINGS, JUDGE:
Appellant Herold L. Gregory ("Gregory"),
Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family
Trust ('Trusts"), appeals from a district court
order entered after a four-day trial reforming
a land sale contract with appellees, Allen R.
and Josephine M. Grahn ("Grahns"), and
rescinding the sale of a contiguous parcel of
land to appellants Dean and Christi Bradshaw
("Bradshaws"). The Bradshaws also appeal the
reformation of the Grahn/Gregory contract.
The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the trial
UTAH

court erred in (1) ordering them to pay for the
additional acreage included after reformation,
and (2) refusing to award attorney fees to
them. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
We recite the facts in a light favorable to
the decision of the fact finder. See Security
State Bank v. Broadhcad, 734 P.2d 469, 47071 (Utah 1987); Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d
1226,1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
This dispute involves a parcel of land,
owned by the Trusts, located at 2811 Brookburn Road in Salt Lake County. Before it was
subdivided, the property was an estate consisting of a home with private drive access.
In 1984, the Trusts hired a surveyor to
subdivide a one-half acre plot to be deeded
to Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the
Trusts. Danielson, with the knowledge of
Gregory, instructed the surveyor to locate the
one-half acre parcel in the southeast corner
and to stake such a parcel "to the south and
east off the road, us[ing] the road as the
boundary." The larger remaining parcel was
designated "parcel one" at trial, while the onehalf acre parcel was designated "parcel two."
When the surveyor prepared the legal description of parcel two, he made a four-degree
error in describing a turn. Thus, the legal
description of parcel two mistakenly included
a part of the private drive which the Trusts
and the surveyor intended to be included in
parcel one.
Danielson decided not to build on parcel
two and deeded the property back to the
Trusts. Gregory then listed both parcels with a
broker. Gregory directed the broker to advise
potential buyers the survey stakes placed along
the east side of the private driveway formed
the boundary between the two parcels and to
assure potential buyers the private drive providing access to the existing home was part of
parcel one.
The broker showed the property to the
Grahns and advised them that either or both
of the two parcels could be purchased. The
broker removed snow from the survey stakes
on the south and east side of the private drive
to identify the boundary line between the two
parcels and to confirm the private drive was
part of parcel one.
The Grahns sought assurances as to the
physical boundaries of the parcels on numerous occasions and explicitly stated they
wanted the private drive as part of parcel one.
The Grahns were not concerned about the
acreage of parcel one, but with the physical
boundaries of the property as identified by the
survey stakes. The broker testified at trial that
because of the unique nature of the estate, it
would be unusual for the parties to be concerned with the acreage rather than the physical
boundaries of the property.
Both the Grahns and Gregory understood
and intended at the time the sale was negotiated that the private drive would be included
CE REPORTS
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within parcel one and yet still provided onein the sale of parcel one to the Grahns.
After determining to purchase parcel one, half acre for parcel two in accordance with his
the Grahns sought a legal description for the original instructions. However, Gregory rejeparcel to include in the Earnest Money Agre- cted this survey because the Bradshaws could
ement. Josephine Grahn telephoned the Gre- not construct the house they had designed on
gorys requesting a legal description and was the re-drawn parcel. The surveyor was then
referred to the tax notices. Josephine Grahn instructed to draft a new survey without refthen went to the Salt Lake County Recorder's erence to the private drive as the boundary
Office and obtained a legal description. App- I between the parcels.
arently, the Recorder's Office had used the
Prior to closing the sale of parcel two,
Danielson deed on parcel two as a basis for Gregory gave the Bradshaws the opportunity
the legal description for parcel one. Thus, the to avoid their agreement, but they refused. On
Recorder's Office subtracted the .56 acres in November 20, 1986, Gregory and the Bradsparcel two from the 1.67 acreage of the total haws closed the sale of parcel two using the
property and included an 1.11 acre figure in original mistaken legal description. At that
the legal description of parcel one. As a result time, Gregory and the Bradshaws entered into
of the mistake on the original survey, the another agreement which provided: "In the
Recorder's legal description of parcel one was event that buyer cannot obtain the full .56
not in conformity with the physical staked acre according to the legal description, seller
boundaries of parcel one. Neither the Grahns agrees to nullify sale and refund purchase
nor Gregory were aware of the mistaken legal price.1'
description at this time.
Gregory did not inform the Grahns of the
The Earnest Money Agreement recited the mistaken legal description until after closing
1.11 acre figure and the mistaken legal descr- the sale of parcel two with the Bradshaws.
iption, but also provided for an easement for Gregory then informed the Grahns of the
an aesthetic break between the properties mistake and offered to either rescind their
which would extend into parcel two "from any agreement or to relocate the private drive
point within fifteen (15) feet of the existing within the boundaries of the new parcel.
drive which separates the two lots ...."
The Grahns learned the Bradshaws planned
The Grahns and Gregory closed the sale of to immediately begin construction on their
parcel one on August 1, 1986. The legal des- new home on parcel two. The Grahns, therecription in the deed for the property did not fore, obtained a temporary restraining order
include the 1.11 acre figure.1 The Grahns also to block construction and commenced this
received a right of first refusal to purchase lawsuit seeking reformation of their deed to
parcel two.
include the private drive as part of parcel one.
On September 1, 1986, Gregory entered into The temporary restraining order was converted
an Earnest Money Agreement with the Brad- to a preliminary injunction pending resolution
shaws for the purchase of parcel two. The of this dispute.
agreement provided the sale would close by
The trial court, after a five-day bench
September 15, 1986. Also on September 1, trial, ordered reformation of the Grahns'
Gregory informed the Grahns of his intention deed, finding the deed did not conform to the
to sell the property and extended them the agreement between Gregory and the Grahns to
right of first refusal on parcel two in accord- include the private drive in parcel one. In
ance with the option contained in the Grahn/ addition, the trial court ordered the Grahns to
Gregory Earnest Money Agreement on parcel pay $12,604.06 as the fair market value of the
one. Under the Earnest Money Agreement, the land in excess of 1.11 acres which would be
Grahns had seven days to exercise the option. included in the reformed parcel. The trial
In the event the Grahns did not exercise the court also rescinded the agreement between
option, the agreement provided that Gregory Gregory and the Bradshaws for the sale of
could sell parcel two within 90 days under the parcel two. The court awarded costs to the
same terms and conditions offered to the Grahns, but did not award them attorney fees.
Grahns under the option. If, however, those
Gregory appeals, claiming the trial court
terms changed, Gregory was required to offer erred in ordering reformation rather than
the Grahns another option term.
rescission of the sale of parcel one. The BraThe Grahns did not exercise their right of dshaws appeal, claiming the court erred in
first refusal and, when the option expired, told determining they were not bona fide purchaGregory to proceed with the sale of parcel two sers, thus, cutting off the Grahns' reformation
to the Bradshaws.
rights and, in addition, that the trial court
On October 11, 1986, Dean Bradshaw dis- erred in denying them damages for an unlacovered the private drive was apparently wful injunction which caused them to lose the
located within the legal description of parcel benefit of their bargain with a material supptwo. The Bradshaws informed Gregory. lier. The Grahns cross-appeal, claiming the
Gregory contacted the surveyor. The surveyor trial court erred in ordering them to pay for
admitted his mistake and completed another the additional acreage and in its denial of their
survey which correctly placed the private drive request for attorney fees.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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MUTUAL MISTAKES-REFORMATION
OR RESCISSION?
Gregory initially argues the trial court erred
in reforming the sale of parcel one to include
the private drive. Although he concedes the
parties both mistakenly believed the private
drive was included in parcel one, he contends
that under the circumstances the proper
remedy was rescission of the sale, not reformation of the contract. Gregory argues the
parties never agreed to the contract as reformed because both parties understood that
only 1.11 acres were included in parcel one
and this was an essential term of the contract
as it left parcel two with the .56 acre necessary
for his sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws.
Under certain circumstances, courts may
reform an agreement to reflect the intent of
the parties. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§155 (1981H states that "(wjhere a writing
that evidences or embodies an agreement in
whole or in part fails to express the agreement
because of a mistake of both parties as to the
contents or effect of the writing, the court
may at the request of a party reform the
writing to express the agreement, except to the
extent that rights of third parties such as good
faith purchasers for value will be unfairly
affected. ^
The Utah Supreme Court set out the criteria
which must be met before reformation is
permissible in Hottlnger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d
1271 (Utah 1984), a case similar to the one
before us. The court stated:
Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate
where the terms of the written instrument arc mistaken in that they
do not show the true intent of the
agreement between the parties.
There are two grounds for reformation of such an agreement: mutual
mistake of the parties and ignorance
or mistake by one party, coupled
with fraud by the other party.
This case is a clear case of mutual
mistake by the parties. The defendant and all subsequent purchasers
except plaintiff agreed that the
understanding and the intent of the
parties to the various deeds was that
the fence line be the boundary. It
was only due to a mistake made by
the drafter of the deed as to the
metes and bounds described that the
deed did not conform to the intent
of the parties. Reformation is
clearly appropriate where there is a
variance between the written deed
and the true agreement of the
parties caused by a draftsman.
Id, at 1273 (footnotes omitted). See also Guardian State Bank v. StangU 778 P.2d 1, 4-
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7 (Utah 1989); Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770,
772 (Utah 1985)/
Reformation is appropriate where the
written instrument is not in conformity with
the parties' agreement, not where the parties
have failed to agree. We will not make a
contract for the parties which they did not
make, only reform a contract to reflect the
I agreement they actually made.9
| The trial court specifically found Gregory
| had told the Grahns that the private drive was
I included in parcel one. In addition, the court
j found that both parties understood the private
drive was included in parcel one and the legal
description did not conform to the parties'
agreement. There is also evidence that the
parties were not concerned with the size of
[ parcel one, but only with the physical staked
[ boundaries of the property.* We note that we
review the trial judge's findings of fact under
the standard set forth in Rule 52 of the Uuh
Rules'of Civil Procedure: "Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses/ Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a). This "clearly erroneous" standard
applies whether the case is one in equity, as is
this case, or one at law. Sec Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1989); Barker v.
Francis, 741 P.2d 548,
551(Utah Q . App. 1987). The trial court's
findings are amply supported by the evidence.
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Only Gregory's self-serving statements
support his argument that the acreage included
in parcel one was essential to the parties'
agreement. The Utah Supreme Court has
previously held that when a party requesting
rescission offers only self-serving statements
concerning the materiality of the mistake, that
testimony is insufficient to support an order
for rescission. See Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d
9,13-14 (Utah 1982).
We agree with the trial court that the parties
intended the private drive to be included in
parcel one and the legal description did not
conform to those intentions and thus conclude
the trial court correctly reformed the deed of
parcel one to reflect the parties' actual agreement.
UNILATERAL MISTAKE
As a secondary claim, Gregory asserts that
his unilateral mistake that there would be
sufficient acreage for the Bradshaws to build
on parcel two is grounds to rescind the sale of
parcel one to the Grahns.
The standard for determining whether rescission is the proper remedy for a unilateral
mistake is as follows:
1. The mistake must be of so grave
a consequence that to enforce the
contract as actually made would be
REPORTS
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unconscionable.
2. The matter as to which the
mistake was made must relate to a
material feature of the contract.
3. Generally the mistake must have
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the
party making the mistake.
4. It must be possible to give relief
by way of rescission without serious
prejudice to the other party except
the loss of his bargain. In other
words, it must be possible to put
him in status quo.
B & A Assocs. v. L.A. Young Sons Constr.
Co., 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah 1990)
(quoting John Call Eng'g v. Manti City Corp.,
141 P.2d 1205, 1209-10 (Utah 1987)); see also
Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 Utah 650,
231 P.2d 724, 727 (1951).
The appellant must marshal all the evidence
which supports the trial court's findings and
show that, in the light most favorable to the
finding, it is against the ""clear weight of the
evidence/ and is thus clearly erroneous when
applied to the foregoing legal principles. See
Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d
1222, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also
Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson,
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
Gregory has failed to marshal the evidence
in support of the trial court's findings and
then to demonstrate that the trial court's
findings were clearly erroneous.7 Thus, we will
not disturb the trial court's reformation of the
deed.*
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
The Bradshaws contend they are bona fide
purchasers of parcel two and thus cut off the
Grahns' right to reform the deed on parcel
one. 9 The Bradshaws admit they knew of the
mistaken description before the sale of parcel
two was completed, but argue they submitted
their Earnest Money Agreement on parcel two
without notice of the mistaken legal description and consequent problems and since the
Earnest Money Agreement is a binding contract, see Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802,
805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), they are bona fide
purchasers. The Grahns, on the other hand,
argue the relevant time for determining bona
fide purchaser status is at the time of
"purchase," i.e., at the closing of the sale.
In Utah, it is clear that a bona fide purchaser can cut off the right of reformation. See
Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273
(Utah 1984) ("the right of reformation of a
deed can be cut off by purchase of the property by a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice of the mistake").
The case law implies the essential time to
measure knowledge is at the time of the actual
sale. A bona fide purchaser is "one who takes
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without actual or constructive knowledge of
facts sufficient to put him on notice of the
complainant's equity." Blodgett v. Marsh, 590
P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
Further, the Utah Supreme Court, in defining
notice, has stated that
[ajctual or constructive notice
defeats a subsequent
purchaser's
interest. A subsequent purchaser
must therefore, show that he had
no actual notice, i.e., no personal
knowledge, of a prior conveyance
or that the prior conveyance did not
impart constructive notice, i.e., was
not recorded before his conveyance
in the same land was recorded.
Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch
Bank, 734 P.2d 904, 906 n.2 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) (emphasis added). See also Diversified
Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1987) (if a subsequent purchaser has information or facts
which would put a prudent person upon
inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to
actual knowledge, an unrecorded conveyance
is not void as against that subsequent purchaser).
The Bradshaws discovered the mistake in
the legal description more than one month
before they closed on the sale of parcel two
with Gregory. Gregory and the Bradshaws
further agreed in writing that the sale would
be nullified if the conveyance could not be as
planned.-We agree with the trial court that the
Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers of
parcel two. 10
PAYMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ACREAGE
The Grahns appeal the trial court's order
requiring them to pay for the additional
acreage in the reformed deed, claiming the
acreage included in parcel one was not a basis
for the bargain between the Grahns and
Gregory. They claim the agreement was that
parcel one as circumscribed by the staked
boundaries was to be sold for the agreed price.
We agree.
The Earnest Money Agreement drafted by
the Grahns recited the 1.11 acre figure, but
also stated that the private drive divided the
two parcels. The deed to parcel one did not
recite the size of the property. We do not find
that this mistaken designation of the size of
parcel one was central to the parties' bargain.
The trial court stated in Finding 13: "The
description to Parcel One was obtained by
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County
Recorder[']s Office. The description designated Parcel One as being 1.11 acres and accepted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as
acreage to be sold and purchased,"
This finding conflicts with the trial court's
Finding of Fact 14 which states Gregory and
the Grahns understood the private drive to be
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Ithe boundary and that the technical description did not conform to the intents of the
'parties. We therefore conclude that Finding of
jFact 13 is clearly erroneous in light of the
| evidence and its inconsistency with the court's
j other findings and conclusions. The trial
, court's order requiring the Grahns to pay for
the additional acreage included is therefore
J reversed.
ATTORNEY FEES
The Grahns also appeal the trial court's
denial of their request for attorney fees, claiming they should be awarded attorney fees
because the evidence demonstrated that
Gregory breached the option agreement, and
but for that breach, this lawsuit would not
have resulted.
In Uuh, parties may recover attorney fees
only if provided for by contract or authorized
by statute. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see also Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schcttlcr, 768 P.2d 950, 965
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, "(ijf provided
for by contract, the award of attorney fees is
allowed only in accordance with the terms of
the contract." Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988.
The contractual language in the Earnest
Money Agreement which provides for attorney
fees states:
Both parties agree that, should
either party default in any of the
covenants or agreements herein
contained, the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee,
which may arise or accrue from
enforcing or terminating this agreement, or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by applicable
law, whether such remedy is
pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
The Earnest Money Agreement between the
Grahns and Gregory included a first right of
refusal option on parcel two. The contractual
language of that option provided:
Should Buyer fail to exercise
Buyers' option under this provision, then Seller shall have the right
to sell the property within ninety
(90) days of the date of the expiration of Sellers' said option on terms
and conditions no more favorable
than those originally offered under
this paragraph to Buyer. Should the
offer be amended making the terms
more favorable, or should the said
offer fail and a new offer be received, _ then the said amendment or
offer shall be, once again, subject
to the terms of this provision. The
terms of this provision shall survive
the closing of the purchase of the
property which is the subject of the
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main Agreement.
The Grahns contend that after they declined
to exercise their option to purchase parcel two,
Gregory offered the Bradshaws more favorable terms and therefore Gregory breached the
option agreement when he did not offer the
option to the Grahns again. The Grahns assert
that the more favorable terms are the extension of the closing date past September 15 and
the additional agreement providing that if
Gregory could not convey the entire .56 acres,
the agreement was void.
The trial court did not make a specific
finding concerning the cause of action for
breach of the option. The court did find,
however, that the •(t]nistee thereafter offered
plaintiffs a first right of refusal to purchase
Parcel Two which was not exercised by plaintiff.0 While not stating so directly, we conclude the trial court inferentialiy found no
breach of the option agreement. Furthermore,
the issue of this lawsuit concerns the amount
of property the parties intended to convey by
the sale of parcel one and is not the result of
any breach of the option to purchase parcel
two. Thus, we find that there was no default
of the option agreement and the trial court
correctly concluded that attorney fees should
not be awarded.
CONCLUSION
We hold the trial court correctly reformed
the land sale contract on parcel one because a
mistake in the legal description included in the
deed did not reflect the parties' agreement.
We conclude the trial court was correct in
finding the Bradshaws were not bona fide
purchasers of parcel two and thus could not
cut off the Grahns' right to reformation.
Additionally, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Grahns were not entitled to
attorney fees as this dispute did not result
from a breach of the option agreement.
However, we reverse the trial court's order
requiring the Grahns to pay for the additional
acreage included in the reformed deed as the
facts clearly support a finding that the parties
agreed to purchase and sell parcel one based
on the physical boundaries of the parcel and
decided on a price for that parcel without
regard to the acreage of parcel one.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. In fact, the Warranty Deed from Gregory to the
Grahns included a legal description different from
that in the Earnest Money Agreement. The source
of this legal description is unknown. The legal description in the Trust Deed from the Grahns to
Gregory was identical to the one in the Warranty
Deed. Neither instrument recited the 1.11 acre
figure.
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section is section 152, which states that
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Restatement

(wjhere a mistake of both parties at the
time the contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which the contract was
made and has a material affect on the
agreed exchange of performances, the
contract is voidable by the adversely
affected party unless he bears the risk of
mistake ....
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152 (1981).
The Restatement notes, however, that
(t]he mere fact that both parties are
mistaken with respect to such an assumption does not, of itself, afford a
reason for avoidance of the contract by
the adversely affected party. Relief is
only appropriate in situations where a
mistake of both parties has such a
material effect on the agreed exchange
of performances as to upset the very
basis for the contract.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §152, comment
a, at 386 (1981).
3. A commentator describes the type of mistake a
court may correct through reformation:
If, on account of a mistake common to
both parties to a bilateral transaction the
written instrument does not express the
true agreement of the parties, equity will
generally correct the instrument so as to
conform to the actual bargain. Perhaps
the most common instance is that of a
conveyance which, because of a mistake
of the scrivener not discovered by either
party, describes too much or too little
property....
G. Clark, Equity §248, at 370-71 (1954).
4. See, e.g., Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63,
64-65 (Utah 1977) (the written instrument failed to
conform with the intent of the parties and the court
reformed the deed to increase the size of the parcel
conveyed to include the boundaries on which the
parties had agreed).
5. We distinguish on their facts several cases
Gregory cites in support of his argument that rescission is the appropriate remedy. Robert Langs ton,
Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (The parties agreed to the sale of a
ranching operation which included grazing permits,
cattle and personal property. However, the parties
were mistaken about the grazing permits, which had
been cancelled; about the number of cattle; and also
about the price and terms.); Eiland v. Powell, 136
W. Va. 25, 65 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1951) (the legal
description in the deed was identical to the legal
description in the contract, thus there was no
mistake by a drafter, just in the representations
made by the seller); Chesapeake Homes, inc. v.
McGraff, 249 Md. 480, 240 A.2d 245, 249 (Ct.
App. 1968) (There was no mistake in the legal description of the property, the seller had misrepresented the boundaries. The court correctly concluded
the parties did not come to an agreement in the first
instance.); Our facts are much closer to the case of
Bartlett v. Department of Transp., 40 Md. App. 47,
388 A.2d 930 (1978). In Bartlett, the court dealt
with the issue of reformation of a deed when the
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parties believed the parcel to be 2-1/2 acres
smaller than it actually was. The Bartlett court reasoned that if a discrepancy in the size of the parcel
would not have prevented the party from entering
the contract, the mistake is immaterial and reformation is appropriate. Id. at 933.
6. Despite the trial court's findings, Gregory's
primary argument in favor of rescission is that he
would never have entered the agreement to sell
parcel one if he had known there would not be a
one-half acre parcel left in parcel two after the
subdivision.
Gregory's position fails for several reasons. First,
prior to the sale of parcel two to the Bradshaws, the
surveyor drafted a revised survey using the private
drive as a boundary, which left parcel two with onehalf acre, but Gregory rejected that survey because
the Bradshaws* house would not fit on it. If, in
fact, Gregory's concern was only with parcel two
containing one-half acre, the revised survey would
have satisfied those concerns. Further, when
Gregory originally entered into the sale of parcel
one to the Grahns, the Grahns had an option to
purchase parcel two, thus the subsequent fact that
the Bradshaws' house plans would not fit on the
property as agreed to or the fact that a variance
would have to be obtained would not have been
relevant at the time of the original sale of parcel
one.
7. Even if Gregory had marshaled the evidence,
however, we find from our independent review of
the evidence that all elements for rescission based
upon unilateral mistake were not met.
Gregory's unilateral mistake did not relate to a
material feature of the contract because, as previously discussed, the size of parcel two was not a
material element in negotiating the sale of parcel
one.
Finally, Gregory's bald assertion that the Grahns
can receive damages to put them back to the status
quo is without support in the evidence. The evidence
at trial established that the Grahns sold their prior
home, invested at least SI0,000 in improvements to
parcel one and put over 1600 hours of time making
the property livable and unique to their tastes.
8. Gregory also argues that under Utah law, a contract is merged into the deed and that when the deed
refers to a metes and bounds description which
differs from oral references to the private drive as
the boundary, the description in the deed prevails.
Mutual mistake is an exception to the general rule
that parol evidence may not contradict, vary', or add
to a deed. Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 981
(Utah 1979). The doctrine of merger is inapplicable
where, as here, one of the parties demonstrates a
mutual mistake in the drafting of the contractual
documents has occurred.
9. The Grahns argue the Bradshaws are not proper
appellants as they have not appealed the rescission
of their agreement with Gregory for the sale of
parcel two. We disagree. The argument in the Bradshaws' appeal, by inference, appeals the rescission
of the Gregory/Bradshaw agreement. By asserting
they are bona fide purchasers, thereby cutting off
the Grahns' reformation rights, the Bradshaws are
appealing the rescission of their contract which resulted from that reformation.
10. The Bradshaws argue they had an enforceable
contract with Rocky Mountain Refractories and as a
result of the wrongful injunction against building on
parcel two, they are entitled to damages for the loss
of that bargain.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE
M. GRAHN, husband and wife,

CIVIL NO. C-86-8833

Plaintiffs,
vs.
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for
and on behalf of the MARITAL
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE ALBERT
ECCLES FAMILY TRUST, and DEAN
BRADSHAW and CHRISTI BRADSHAW,
his wife, and SCOTT McNEIL,
an individual,
Defendants.

This natter came on for trial before the Honorable John A.
Rokich on September 24, 1987.

The plaintiffs were present, and

represented by Robert M. Taylor and John S. Adams.

Defendant

Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, and on behalf of the Marital and
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, hereinafter
referred to as "trustee" was present, and represented by Jeffrey
K. Woodbury.
wife,

were

Defendant

Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi Bradshaw, his
present,

Scott

and

McNeil

represented

was

by

present, and

Russell

S.

Walker.

represented

by his

counsel Allen Sims.
The

Court

heard

the

testimony

of

witnesses,

admitted

documentary evidence, viewed the property which was the subject
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matter of this litigation, read the Memoranda on file herein,
heard oral arguments, and then took the matter under advisement
pending
received

the

receipt

the

of

supplemental

supplemental

Memoranda.

Memoranda, reviewed

The

the

Court

file, its

notes, the Memoranda on file and the documentary evidence.
The Court made inquiries from time to time as to the status
of this matter.

The Court was advised that the parties were

attempting to negotiate a settlement.

The Court finally called

plaintiffs' counsel and requested that this matter be noticed up
for hearing and that their clients be present.

The hearing was

not held because of the illness of one of the attorneys.
Court was

advised

that

settlement

agreement,

Conclusions of Law.

the parties

nor

agree

could not enter

upon

Findings

of

The

into a

Fact

and

The Court advised counsel it could prepare

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law so that this case can be
concluded at least on the District Court level and the parties
can take whatever action they deem appropriate.
The Court held

a hearing on November 10, 1988 for the

purpose of reviewing the status of this case with counsel and
their clients.

The Court explained to counsel and the litigants

that the Court is not the reason for the delay in the resolution
of this case.

The delay is the result of settlement negotiations

and the parties being unable to agree upon the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

Since the parties could not agree, the
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Court, upon its own initiative, prepared Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in accordance with its Memorandum Decision.
The Court submitted its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
to counsel for review.

Counsel have filed objections to the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Court took notice

of the objections and modified or corrected paragraph 20 of the
Findings of Fact and paragraphs 2, 4 and 9 of the Conclusions of
Law.
The Court now being fully advised in the premises and having
rendered its oral decision and two written Memorandum Decisions,
now makes the following final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs are and were at all relevant times residents

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

The defendant Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert

Eccles Family Trust, Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, are owners of
certain

real

property

located

at

approximately

2811

East

Brookburn Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Defendants

Dean

Bradshaw

and

Christi

Bradshaw

are

individuals residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Scott McNeil is an individual residing in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
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The real property owned by the defendant trusts was

listed for sale.

The real property listed, after negotiation for

the sale and purchase thereof was divided into two parcels.
the

time

of

trial

the

Court

designated

for

At

identification

purposes the two parcels as Parcel One and Parcel Two.
6.

Trustee

represented

to

the

plaintiffs

that

the

southeasterly edge of the road was the boundary between Parcel
One and Parcel Two, and that a 15 foot aesthetic easement along
the southeasterly edge of the private road was to be included if
and when trustee sold Parcel Two.
7.

The private road provided ingress and egress to Parcel

8.

Trustee did engage defendant McNeil to survey a one-

One.

half acre lot on the southeasterly side of the private roadway
for a building lot for Barbara Danielson.

The Court designated

said lot as Parcel Two.
9.

Plaintiffs and trustee entered into an Earnest Money

Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One (including
the private road) on March 18, 1986, which transaction was closed
on August 1, 198 6.
10.

Defendants

Bradshaws

and

trustee

entered

into

an

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for the
purchase .of Parcel Two.

The legal description used for Parcel

Two had been prepared by defendant McNeil.
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The Earnest Money Agreement entered into by defendants

Bradshaws

and

trustee

provided,

among

other

things,

that

plaintiffs Grahns had first right of refusal to purchase Parcel
Two.
12.
refusal

Trustee thereafter offered plaintiffs a first right of
to

purchase

Parcel

Two

which

was

not

exercised

by

Parcel

One

was

obtained

by

plaintiffs.
13.

The

description

to

plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County Recorders Office.

The

description

and

designated

Parcel

One

as

being

1.11

acres

accepted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as acreage to be
sold and purchased.
14.

Plaintiffs

Grahn

and

trustee

understood

that

the

southeasterly edge of the road was to be the boundary and the
technical

description

did

not conform

to the

intent of the

plaintiffs Grahn and trustee.
15.

Plaintiffs Grahn, by including the road in Parcel One

received in excess of 1.11 acres of land.
16.

At the time defendants Bradshaw executed the Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One,
they did not rely upon the survey as describing the boundaries,
but upon the physical boundary, the southeasterly side of the
private* roadway.
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The defendants Bradshaw did rely upon the reference

made by defendant McNeil that Parcel Two contained .5 acres.
18.

The defendants Bradshaw needed

obtain a building permit

.5 acres in order to

from the Salt Lake County Planning

Commission.
19.

If Parcel Two did

not contain

.5 acres, defendant

Bradshaws could terminate the agreement and trustee refund the
purchase price.
20.

Prior to defendants Bradshaws closing on the purchase

of Parcel Two, trustee discovered that the' McNeil survey was in
error and the remapping of the survey of Parcel Two by defendant
McNeil showed that a portion of the private road was contained in
Parcel Two.
21.

Defendants

Bradshaw

did

not

have

an

enforceable

agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories.
22.

The

legal

description

contemplated

to be used

for

Parcel Two was in error and did not conform with the intent of
the parties, that Parcel Two has located on the southeasterly
edge of the private road.
23.

Plaintiffs did not rely upon defendant McNeil's survey

of Parcel Two and were owed no duty by defendant McNeil.
24.

The Court makes no finding as to the trustee's claim

against- McNeil at this time because counsel for trustee and
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McNeil have advised the Court that this issue may be resolved by
a stipulation between those parties.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
reformed

The
to

deed

between

include

the

trustee

private

and

plaintiffs

roadway

should be

as Parcel

One and

plaintiffs should pay for the excess acreage.
2.

Plaintiffs Grahn and trustee stipulate that $12,604.04

represents a fair value of the ground in excess of 1.11 acres.
Interest shall be paid on the $12,604.06 commencing on a date
determined by the Court.
3.

The

reformed

deed

shall

also

acknowledge

that the

fifteen (15) foot aesthetic and geologic easement shall remain as
agreed in the surviving provisions of the March 18, 1986 Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement, which easement
runs along the southeasterly side of the private road.
4.

Defendant Bradshaws are not bona fide purchasers and

therefore not entitled to specifically enforce the agreement for
the purchase

of

Parcel Two, and except

for the

reformation

referred to hereinabove, the parties shall be placed in the same
position as before the Bradshaw transaction.
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The transaction between trustee and defendants Bradshaw

should be rescinded.
6.

Bradshaws have no cause of action against plaintiffs

for the alleged prevention by injunction of the building of their
home on Parcel Two.
7.

Plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant

McNeil for the erroneous first survey completed with respect to
Parcel Two.
8.

The defendant trustee's claims against defendant McNeil

may be pursued in separate litigation in a future action as
provided by stipulation between defendant trustee and defendant
McNeil.
9.

The Court does not award attorney's fees to any of the

parties, but does award costs to the plaintiffs against all
defendants except defendant McNeil.

All other parties must bear

their own costs and fees.
Dated this

r^<

day of December, 1988.

#A^ 4

JOHN A. ROKICH
?RICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEel

By

Ucxkihc

DWUJIY
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage
prepaid, to the following, this

Robert M. Taylor
John S. Adams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq.
2677 E. Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Allen Sims, Esq.
#8 E. Broadway, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Russell S. Walker, Esq.
50 S, Main, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

.41^

day of December, 1988:

